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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s (PC) phenomenal conservatism––the 
internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how 
things seems or appears to us to be––doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma 
for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that 
Bergmann adduces to conclude that (PC) is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. 
After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to 
the justification of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a 
straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject 
to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the 
claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As 
(PC) is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer 
that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to (PC) is unmotivated. In the final 
part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types 
of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-
grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form 




The claim that many of our beliefs are epistemically justified because they are based on our 
seemings––i.e. ways things seem or appear to us to be––looks prima facie plausible. For example, I 
have a reason for believing that the cat is on the chair because it seems visually so to me. I have a 
reason for believing that I went home by car because I seem to remember driving home. I have a 
reason for believing that 2+2=4 because this seems intuitively correct to me. Michael Huemer’s 
phenomenal conservatism aims to account systematically for the justifying force of seemings.1 The 
                                                
1 Phenomenal conservatism is most commonly associated with Huemer’s work. Others epistemologists––such as Jim 
Pryor (2000) and John Pollock (1986)––have proposed similar views, though less general than phenomenal 
conservatism. For a list of philosophers who have defended phenomenal conservatism or a similar view see Moretti 
(2015: §1). 
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defining principle of Huemer’s view says that: 
 
(PCP) If it seems to [a subject] S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters S thereby has 
some degree of justification for believing that P. (Huemer 2007: 30)2 
 
Most phenomenal conservatives hold that S’s having a seeming that P is a matter of S’s having a 
certain sort of experience, which has propositional content P but is unanalyzable in terms of belief. 
According to this popular conception, all experiences constituting seemings are essentially 
characterized by felt veridicality––i.e. the feel of a mental state whose propositional content reveals 
how things really are (cf. Tucker 2013: §1.1). (PCP) is customarily read as a principle about 
propositional, rather than doxastic, justification (see for instance McGrath 2013: 233).3 Note the 
‘thereby’ in (PCP), which signals that S’s justification for P is based on only S’s seeming that P. In 
other words, according to (PCP), in absence of defeaters, S’s seeming that P provides S with some 
degree of non-inferential justification for believing P. That is to say, in absence of defeaters, S’s 
seeming that P supplies S with some justification for believing P that is not based on justification 
for believing any other proposition (cf. Huemer 2013: §1c). 
 (PCP)’s philosophical appeal seems to rest on at least three reasons:4 first, (PCP) supplies a 
rationale for many of our ordinary epistemic practices. In ordinary circumstances we might have 
more or less explicit beliefs about, say, the trustworthiness of our experiences or the reliability of 
our faculties, but our reasons for holding many of our ordinary beliefs don’t seem to include the 
reasons we have for these additional beliefs. Instead, we seem to entertain many of our ordinary 
beliefs just because of how things appear to us to be. Furthermore, we usually attribute perceptual 
                                                
2 The superscript ‘P’ in ‘(PCP)’ indicates, as clarified below, that this principle concerns propositional justification. 
Huemer (2001) defends a stronger version of (PCP) according to which, for any proposition P, if it seems to S that P, S 
has prima facie justification for fully believing P. 
3 S has propositional justification for a proposition P just in case P is epistemically worthy of being believed by S, 
because S has a reason for doing so, whether or not she actually believes P for that reason or at all. On the other hand, S 
has doxastic justification for P just in case S has propositional justification for P and S bases her actual belief that P on 
the reason she has for believing P.  
4 Huemer has also articulated a few arguments in defence (PCP). For a critical overview see Moretti (2015: §3). 
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reasons for entertaining beliefs to beings––such as small children––that couldn’t possibly entertain 
the thought that their sensory faculties are reliable.  
A second reason why (PCP) is attractive is that it affords us the means to respond to a 
celebrated sceptical objection targeting the internalist views that assume that the justification for 
any belief is always based on some other belief. Positions of this type have been argued to fall afoul 
of Agrippa’s trilemma: imagine that a subject S’s justification for her belief that P rests on S’s 
belief that Q, and that S’s justification for her belief that Q rests on, say, S’s belief that R and S’s 
belief that S, and so on. In other words, imagine that S’s justification for her belief that P depends 
on S’s having a chain of justified beliefs with one or more branches. If it is assumed that the 
justification for any of S’s beliefs always rests on some other belief of S, there are prima facie only 
three ways in which each branch can be structured: S has no justification for the last belief in the 
branch; S has justification for each belief in the branch but the branch is circular; S has justification 
for each belief in the branch but the branch never ends. It has been argued that none of these options 
is really tenable or capable of securing justification for S’s initial belief that P. For this reason, 
epistemological internalism has been charged with leading to scepticism. If (PCP) also describes an 
internalistically admissible way to acquire justification, the internalist has a fourth option: she can 
contend that the last beliefs in the branches are justified (at least to some degree) by special mental 
states of S––i.e. seemings––that don’t need in turn to be justified. This dismisses sceptical 
concerns. 
 The third reason why (PCP) looks philosophically appealing is that it provides a unified 
account of non-inferential justification of beliefs of different types––various philosophers have 
appealed to (PCP) or very similar principles to explain non-inferential justification of, for instance, 
perceptual, mnemonic, a priori, introspective, moral and religious beliefs.5  
                                                
5 For reference to relevant literature see Moretti (2015: §1). 
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Phenomenal conservatism has an internalist character because, roughly, seeming-based 
justification appears to be determined only by factors that are internal to the subject’s cognitive 
perspective. Bergmann (2006) has launched a powerful attack against epistemological internalism 
in general. In a nutshell, Bergmann claims that epistemological internalism essentially requires that 
a subject S’s justification for believing a proposition P must be based on S’s awareness of a 
justification contributor. That S must be aware of a justification contributor is, according to 
Bergmann, ambiguous between two different readings. The problem is that this awareness 
requirement is, if interpreted in one way, incapable of giving the internalist what she wants, whereas 
impossible to satisfy, if interpreted in the other. Bergmann (2013) argues that phenomenal 
conservatism falls afoul of this general objection.  
Bergmann (2013: 160) endorses the mainstream view among phenomenal conservatives 
according to which seemings are, not beliefs (or inclinations to believe), but experiences with felt 
veridicality. In his attempt to reject internalism, Bergmann explicitly concentrates on doxastic 
justification (cf. 2006: 4). The most natural version of (PCP) that applies to doxastic justification 
would probably be a principle like this: 
 
(PCD) A person S’s belief that P is prima facie justified to some degree if it is based on its 
seeming to S that P.6                                                             
 
However, Bergmann doesn’t take (PCD) or a very similar conditional to be the defining principle of 
phenomenal conservatism (in its doxastic variant), as one might expect. Bergmann claims that 
phenomenal conservatism is an internalist position only if it requires that a subject justified in 
believing something be aware of a relevant justification contributor. From this he infers or seems to 
infer that phenomenal conservatism is an internalist position only if its defining principle requires 
that a subject justified in believing a proposition be aware of a relevant justification contributor. 
                                                
6 The superscript ‘D’ in ‘(PCD)’ indicates that this principle concerns doxastic justification. Note that (PCD) is true if and 
only if it is true that if it seems to S that P, in absence of defeaters S has some degree of justification for believing that 
P, whether or not S actually believes P on the basis of her seeming that P or at all. This is the same as saying that (PCD) 
is true if and only if (PCP) is true. Huemer (2013: §1c) appears to endorse––at least implicitly––this biconditional.  
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Since (PCD) just states a sufficient condition––and thus in fact requires nothing––for S’s 
justification for P, Bergmann (2013: 154) concludes that (PCD) cannot be considered to be the 
defining principle of phenomenal conservatism, if the latter is an internalist position. Accordingly, 
Bergmann takes the central principle of phenomenal conservatism to be the following biconditional 
version of (PCD), which does impose a requirement on S’s justification for P: 
(PCD*) A person S’s belief that P is prima facie justified to some degree if and only if it is 
based on its seeming to S that P.                                                               
 
We grant Bergmann’s assumption that a position is internalist only if it requires that a 
subject justified in believing a proposition be aware of a relevant justification contributor. However, 
it seems to us that from this assumption it doesn’t follow that phenomenal conservatism is 
internalist only if its defining principle requires that a subject justified in believing a proposition be 
aware of a relevant justification contributor. What appears to us to follow is rather this: phenomenal 
conservatism is internalist only if a subject possessing the justification for believing a proposition 
described by its defining principle is required to be aware of a relevant justification contributor. 
More precisely, the phenomenal conservative is an internalist only if she accepts that: 
 
(INTPC)  S’s belief that P is prima facie justified to some degree by S’s seeming that P only 
if S is aware of her seeming that P. 
 
Since the phenomenal conservative can accept this proposition whether she accepts (PCD) or 
(PCD*), pace Bergmann, it appears to be false that (PCD) cannot be the defining principle of 
phenomenal conservatism, if the latter is an internalist position. Quite the opposite, there is a reason 
why (PCD) appears to be preferable to (PCD*) in this role. (PCD*), but not (PCD), entails the claim 
that all epistemic justification is based on seemings, which looks implausible even to advocates of 
phenomenal conservatism.7 Furthermore, as the reader will be able to verify in the next section, 
                                                
7 Bergmann (2013: 154, n4) claims that some passages in Huemer’s papers can be interpreted as suggesting that 
Huemer himself would endorse (PCD*). However, it is rather unclear how, for instance, inferential justification could 
turn out to be seeming-based justification. Huemer (2013: 1c) himself emphasizes that it is controversial even among 
supporters of phenomenal conservatism whether or not a variation of phenomenal conservatism could account for 
inferential justification.  
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whether the phenomenal conservative sticks to (PCD) or (PCD*) seems to be substantially 
irrelevant for the applicability and effectiveness of Bergmann’s dilemma. For all these reasons in 
the remainder of the paper we will take (PCD) to be the defining principle of phenomenal 
conservatism.  
Our paper essentially aims to respond to Bergmann’s objections to phenomenal 
conservatism. We will proceed as follows. In §2 we introduce Bergmann’s general argument 
against epistemological internalism––namely, his dilemma––and explain why it apparently applies 
to phenomenal conservatism. In §3 we argue that the thought experiment that Bergmann uses to 
show that phenomenal conservatism is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target and thus gives no 
reason in support of Bergmann’s claim. In §4 and its subsections we distinguish between two ways 
in which a mental state can contribute to the justification of a belief: the direct way and the indirect 
way. After that, we identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed 
indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma, and we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to 
the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. We argue 
that, in accordance with (PCD), seemings contribute justification directly. We conclude that 
Bergmann’s claim that his dilemma applies to phenomenal conservatism is unmotivated. In §5 we 
suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist 
justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can 
be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of 
internalist foundationalism.   
 
2. Bergmann’s dilemma and phenomenal conservatism  
We now introduce Bergmann’s general argument against epistemological internalism and explain 
why it seems to apply to phenomenal conservatism as well. According to Bergman, an essential 
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condition that any internalist notion of epistemic justification should meet is the awareness 
requirement, which could be stated as follows: 
 
(AW) S’s belief B is [prima facie] justified [to some degree] only if (i) there is something, 
X, that contributes to the justification of B––e.g. evidence for B or a truth indicator 
for B or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s justification––and (ii) S 
is aware (or potentially aware) of X.    
                                                                            (Bergmann 2006: 9) 
 
(AW) derives its motivation substantially from two intuitions: the first is that S’s belief B would not 
be doxastically justified to any degree for S if this belief were not different, from S’s point of view, 
from a “stray hunch” or “arbitrary conviction”. The second intuition is that the minimal requirement 
to be satisfied to make this difference is that S be aware of the existence of some X relevant to the 
justification or truth of B. (Cf. 2006: 11-12). We find Bergmann’s claim that internalist justification 
must satisfy a principle like (AW) quite plausible; thus, in this paper we will not question it. 
According to Bergmann, the claim (ii) that S is aware of X, in (AW), can be interpreted in 
two alternative ways. The crux of his argument is that both interpretations prove equally fatal for 
internalism. This is what Bergmann calls the internalist’s dilemma (cf. 2006: 13-14). On the first 
interpretation, (AW) requires of S that she be aware of X in––to use Bergmann’s words––the strong 
sense of ‘being aware of’. This means that S must be actually aware––or at least able to be aware on 
reflection alone––of the justification-contributor X in such a way that S conceives of X as relevant 
to the justification or truth of B8 (cf. 2006: 14-16). On the second interpretation, (AW) requires of S 
that she be aware of X in––to use again Bergmann’s expression––the weak sense of ‘being aware 
of’. This means that S must be aware of the justification-contributor X but not conceptually of the 
fact that X is relevant to the justification or truth of the belief B. This type of awareness doesn’t 
necessarily require S to conceive of X in some way or another: S may be aware of X in this sense by 
simply having a relation of non-conceptual acquaintance with X, or, when X is the right sort of 
                                                
8 The expression ‘X is relevant to the justification of truth of B’ is used by Bergmann––and we follow him in this use––
as a generic way to refer to epistemic relevance. This expression could thus be replaced by others such as ‘X is evidence 
for B’ or ‘X is a truth-indicator for B’ and so on. (Cf. Bergmann 2006: 15, n23). 
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justification-contributor, by simply having X consciously. If S does conceive of X in some way, S 
is weakly aware of X only if S doesn’t conceive of X as something relevant to the justification or 
truth of B. (Cf. 2006: 19). According to Bergmann, either interpretation of ‘is aware of’ in (AW) 
raises insurmountable problems to those who accept internalist notions of justification. If ‘is aware 
of’ is interpreted by the internalist in the first sense––as requiring S’s strong awareness of X––this 
launches a vicious infinite regress leading to the sceptical conclusion that no belief could ever be 
(internalistically) justified to any degree for S.9 If ‘is aware of’ in (AW) is interpreted by the 
internalist in the second sense––as only requiring S’s weak awareness of X––the internalist’s notion 
of justification will fall afoul of the Subject’s Perspective Objection (SPO). The (SPO) says that the 
satisfaction of the specified conditions for justification10 cannot prevent S’s beliefs from being just 
accidentally true from S’s perspective,11 and thus from being actually unjustified for S to any 
degree. (Cf. 2006: 12 and 19-21). 
In this paper we focus on the weak reading of ‘is aware of’ and argue––against Bergmann––
that the claim that the phenomenal conservative cannot opt for this horn of the dilemma is 
unmotivated.  For this reason, we will not dispute Bergmann’s claim that the strong reading of is 
‘aware of’ launches a vicious infinite regress leading to scepticism.12 Let us then examine in some 
detail why––according to Bergmann––the weak reading horn of his dilemma proves inhospitable to 
                                                
9 At least if S is a cognitively limited subject as we are. The reader should be careful not to confuse this infinite regress 
with the infinite regress constituting one of the options of Agrippa’s trilemma, considered in the previous section.   
10 Note that the (SPO) was first explicitly formulated by Bonjour (1985: 41-43) but directed against externalist notions 
of justification. 
11 Let be (NA) the claim that the truth of S’s belief B is not accidental from S’s point of view. It is somewhat unclear 
how (NA) should be intended. Bergmann (2013: 168) explicitly addresses this question, and considers five different 
conditions each of which would count, if accepted, as necessary and sufficient for the truth of (NA). Precisely: (I) S is 
aware of X and X in fact indicates B’s truth; (II) S is aware of X and S epistemically should believe that X indicates B’s 
truth; (III) S doesn’t believe that B is formed in an unreliable way (so that it’s unlikely to be true); (IV) It’s false that S 
epistemically should believe that B is formed in an unreliable way (so that it’s unlikely to be true); (V) S is aware of X 
and S believes that X indicates B’s truth (or at least conceives of X as being relevant to B’s truth or justification). 
Bergmann argues––convincingly in our view––that the internalist cannot interpret (NA) in ways (I)-(IV). Bergmann 
also contends that the internalist should accept (V) as a condition both necessary and sufficient for the truth of (NA). 
We find it reasonable that the internalist should accept (V) as a condition only sufficient for the truth of (NA). In this 
paper we indicate two additional and different ways in which something of which S is aware can prevent the accidental 
truth of S’s belief B from S’s perspective. 
12 Rogers and Matheson (2011) and Crisp (2009) deny that this regress is vicious. See Bergmann (2013: 165)’s 
response. We do not take position on this dispute in this paper. 
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the internalist. Suppose X contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P because, among other 
things, X is relevant to the truth of P (imagine for instance that X reliably indicates that P is true). 
On the weak reading of ‘being aware of’ in (AW), S’s being justified in believing that P requires of 
S that she be aware of X but not in such a way that S also (potentially) conceives of X as relevant to 
the justification or truth of her belief that P. Thus the internalist who attempts to occupy the second 
horn of Bergmann’s dilemma ought to claim that it is a condition necessary for the justification of 
S’s belief that P that S be aware of X, but that it is not a condition necessary for it that S 
(potentially) conceives of X as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. If so––
according to Bergmann––the internalist holds a notion of justification that entails that S’s belief that 
P can be justified even when the truth of P is just accidental from S’s point of view. For even if X is 
relevant to P’s justification or truth (for instance because X reliably indicates that P is true), and 
even if S is aware of X, the truth of her belief that P is accidental from S’s perspective if S doesn’t 
(potentially) conceive of X as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. Thus, if the 
internalist opts for the weak reading of ‘being aware of’ in (AW), the internalist’s notion of 
justification will fall afoul of the (SPO).  
Let’s now turn to phenomenal conservatism. As we have seen in §1, the phenomenal 
conservative is an internalist only if she accepts: 
(INTPC)  S’s belief that P is prima facie justified to some degree by S’s seeming that P only 
if S is aware of her seeming that P. 
 
Accepting the above conditional has in fact the effect that S’s justification based on a seeming that 
P satisfies the general awareness requirement imposed by (AW)––namely, its condition (ii) that S 
be aware of the justification contributor X––in the specific case in which X is S’s seeming that P.  
To show that phenomenal conservatism falls afoul of his dilemma, Bergmann needs thus to 
show that, on the strong reading of ‘is aware of’ in (INTPC), attempting to satisfy the request that S 
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be aware of her seeming that P yields a lethal infinite regress, and on the weak reading of ‘is 
aware of’ in (INTPC), the internalist’s notion of seeming-based justification is stricken by the (SPO).  
Bergmann (2013: 164-166) actually argues that, on the strong reading of ‘is aware of’ 
(which requires S to conceive of or being able to conceive of her seeming that P as relevant to the 
justification or truth of her belief that P), S cannot be aware of her seeming that P. For if S 
attempted it, S would be caught in a vicious infinite regress. On the other hand, to substantiate the 
claim that on the weak interpretation of ‘is aware of’ phenomenal conservatism is hit by the (SPO), 
Bergmann (2013: 171-172) adduces a thought experiment in which a subject S is incapable of 
conceiving of her actual seeming that P as relevant to the justification or truth of the belief that P. 
The scenario envisaged by Bergmann verifies the following four claims: (i) S has a seeming that P; 
(ii) due to cognitive malfunctioning S is incapable of conceiving of her seeming that P as relevant 
to the justification or truth of her belief that P, (iii) S forms the true belief that P independently of 
her seeming and without any actual reason for doing it, and (iv) intuitively, the truth of S’s belief 
that P is accidental from S’s own perspective. According to Bergman, this thought experiment 
supports the general conclusion that S’s mere weak awareness of her seeming that P is unable to 
guarantee that the truth of S’s belief that P is non-accidental from S’s point of view. Interpreted as 
requiring S to be just weakly aware of her seeming that P, the internalist’s notion of seeming-based 
justification would then fall afoul of the (SPO).  
Jason Rogers and Jonathan Matheson (2011: 60-63) have argued that a number of internalist 
notions of justifications escape Bergmann’s dilemma. They suggest that phenomenal conservatism 
doesn’t succumb to the weak reading horn of the dilemma. They contend that if the justifier X of S’s 
belief that P is S’s seeming that P, then it is intuitively plausible that S’s mere weak awareness of 
that seeming––i.e. S’s mere having it––guarantees on its own that the truth of S’s belief that P is not 
accidental from S’s point of view (cf. 2011: 60-63). We believe that Rogers and Matheson’s 
contention is correct. This paper is essentially dedicated to back it by showing that when S's belief 
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that P is based on S's seeming that P, it is unmotivated to require that S should be strongly aware 
of her seeming that P in order for the truth of S’s belief that P to be non-accidental from S’s 
viewpoint. 
 
3. Bergmann’s thought experiment is ill-conceived 
In this section we argue that Bergmann’s thought experiment to supports the claim that S’s mere 
weak awareness of her seeming that P is unable to guarantee that the truth of S’s belief that P is 
non-accidental from S’s viewpoint misses its target, and thus it gives no reason for supposing that 
this claim is true.  
Let’s us examine Bergmann’s thought experiment more closely. Bergmann suggests that in 
very special circumstances, a subject S could have a seeming that P (with its unaltered 
characteristic phenomenology of revealing how things really are) and at the same time be simply 
incapable of recognizing any connection between the seeming that P and the truth of her belief that 
P due to a severe cognitive malfunction. Bergmann suggests that S’s having a seeming that P can be 
compared to S’s being told by someone that P. People normally take testimony that P as a reason to 
think that P is true, but it’s possible for a person to be damaged in such a way that she has no 
tendency whatsoever to take testimony that P as a reason for believing that P. Likewise, according 
to Bergmann, it would be possible for S to be damaged in such a way that she is absolutely 
incapable of conceiving of a seeming that P as a reason for believing that P even if that seeming 
occurs in S’s mind with its characteristic feeling of revealing how things really are (cf. 2013: 172, 
n21). Drawing from these considerations, Bergmann envisages a situation in which S is affected by 
the cognitive malfunction just described, she has a seeming that P and, at the same time, holds the 
true belief that P only for a silly motive or for no reason at all. In such a case, S has a conscious 
seeming that P and yet it is strongly intuitive that––we agree with Bergmann on this point––it is 
only an accident from S’s perspective that her belief that P is true (cf. 2013: 171-172 and 173-174). 
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Let’s suppose that the situation envisaged by Bergmann is possible. What does this 
example actually teach us? It only teaches us that if a subject S is just weakly aware of a seeming 
that P, believes that P but bases her belief that P on neither her seeming that P nor on any other 
source of epistemic justification, then it is an accident from S’s perspective that her belief that P is 
true. Thus Bergmann’s example gives us no reason for claiming that S’s weak awareness of her 
seeming that P cannot prevent S’s belief that P from being accidentally true from S’s own 
perspective when S’s belief that P is based on her seeming that P.13 Since (PCD) entails that S’s 
belief that P is prima facie justified to some degree for S if based on S’s seeming that P––which is 
not the case in Bergmann’s thought experiment––Bergmann’s example can hardly show that if the 
phenomenal conservative opts for the weak reading of ‘being aware of’ in (INTPC), her notion of 
justification will fall afoul of the (SPO). 
 
4. Seemings don’t require strong awareness   
In this section and its subsections we give further reasons for believing that when S's belief that P is 
based on S's seeming that P, it is unmotivated to require that S should be strongly aware of her 
seeming that P in order for the truth of S’s belief that P to be non-accidental from S’s viewpoint. 
We proceed as follows: we start by distinguishing between the direct and the indirect contribution 
of a subject S’s mental state X to the justification of S's beliefs. Then we argue that Bergmann’s 
requirement––according to which S must be strongly aware of X in order for the truth of the belief 
that P not to be accidental from S’s point of view––appears rationally motivated when X contributes 
indirectly to the justification of the belief that P but it doesn’t appear rationally motivated when X 
contributes directly to it. After this, we argue that although S’s seeming that P can contribute to the 
                                                
13 Bergmann could try to meet this objection by retreating to the claim that S’s weak awareness of her seeming that P 
cannot prevent the proposition that P from being accidentally true from S’s own perspective. Bergmann’s thought 
experiment, however, is irrelevant for this different conclusion. In this example, S bases her belief that P on no reason; 
so what is clear about S is just that it is an accident, on her part, that she comes to believe a truth while forming the 
belief that P. The example, in other words, leaves unsettled the question about whether S’s epistemic situation is such 
that the truth of the proposition that P is also an accident from her point of view.    
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justification of the belief that P also indirectly, phenomenal conservatism is the view that S’s 
seeming that P contributes directly to it. We infer from this that the claim that S’s weak awareness 
of S’s seeming that P doesn’t suffice to prevent her belief that P, based on that seeming, from being 
accidentally true from S’s perspective is unmotivated. We conclude that there are no compelling 
reasons to believe that the phenomenal conservative cannot escape the vicious infinite regress 
described by Bergmann without running afoul of the (SPO). 
 
4.1 Direct and indirect contribution of a mental state to the justification of a belief 
Phenomenal conservatism is the view according to which a specific mental state of a subject S––i.e. 
S’s seeming that P––contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P. Showing that Bergmann’s 
dilemma applies to phenomenal conservatism requires then to grant that the justification-contributor 
X of which S must be aware in order to have internalist justification can be a mental state of S. 
When this much is granted, it’s important not to lose sight of an ambiguity surrounding the claim 
that S’s mental state X contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P. For any mental state X and 
any belief P of a subject S, X can contribute to the justification of S’s belief that P directly or 
indirectly. In particular: 
 
 
(DJ) X directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P just in case, in absence of 
defeaters, S is doxastically justified (at least to some degree) in believing that P on the 
basis of X. 
 
(IJ) X indirectly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P just in case, in absence 
of defeaters, S is doxastically justified (at least to some degree) in believing that P on 
the basis of S’s introspective belief that X occurs in her mind.14 
 
                                                
14 (IJ) should probably be refined. For S’s introspective belief that provides the basis for S’s belief that P can plausibly 
be, not just the belief that X occurs in S’s mind, but a different introspective belief about X whose content entails the 
content of the first belief. For instance, one could say that S’s pain indirectly contributes to the justification of S’s belief 
that (P) the effect of the anesthetic is quickly fading away if, in absence of defeaters, S is doxastically justified (at least 
to some degree) in believing P on the basis of S’s introspective belief that (Q) S’s pain is quickly increasing. Clearly, Q 
entails the proposition that pain occurs in S’s mind. For easy of presentation and because the refinement wouldn’t 
substantially change our arguments (the reader can easily verify in), we prefer to leave (IJ) unaltered.  
 14 
Consider the following examples. (1) a pain in S’s leg justifies S’s belief that S has a pain in her 
leg. (2) S’s pain in her leg justifies S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over. In both cases it 
seems correct to say that S’s pain contributes to the justification of a belief of S. Yet it also seems 
correct to say that in (1) S’s pain contributes differently than in (2). In (1) S’s pain is the basis––and 
so contributes directly to the justification––of S’s belief that S feels pain in her leg. In (2) S’s pain 
is not the basis of S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over. In this case, S infers the 
proposition that the effect of the anesthetic is over from the proposition that she feels pain in her 
leg; hence S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over is based not on the pain itself but on S’s 
introspective belief that S feels pain in her leg.15 Even so, we can say that S’s pain contributes to the 
justification of S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over; this is true, however, only in the 
indirect sense that S’s belief that the effect of the anesthetic is over is directly justified by S's belief 
about the existence of the pain in her leg.  
Below we give further examples of mental states that contribute directly or indirectly to the 
justification of beliefs. For ease of presentation, hereafter we will freely switch back and forward 
from saying that S’s mental state X directly (indirectly) contributes to the justification of S’s belief 
that P to saying that S’s mental state X is, or contributes as, a direct (indirect) justifier of S’s belief 
that P.  
In many cases, (a) one and the same mental state X of a subject S can be a direct justifier of 
a belief of S and an indirect justifier of another belief of S. Furthermore, for many mental states of 
S––e.g. for beliefs––it normally happens that (b) if the mental state X contributes directly 
(indirectly) to the justification of S’s belief that P, X cannot also contribute indirectly (directly) to 
the justification of the same belief. However, for some mental states (including S’s seemings) it is 
normally the case that (c) if X contributes directly (indirectly) to the justification of a belief of S, 
                                                
15 In this case, S’s introspective belief that she feels pain contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that the 
effect of the anesthetic is over. Furthermore, S’s pain contributes directly to the justification of S’s introspective belief 
that she feels pain. 
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then X can also contribute indirectly (directly) to the justification of the very same belief of S. If 
X happens to be all at once a direct and an indirect justifier of the same belief, it is important not to 
confuse X’s contribution as a direct justifier with X’s contribution as an indirect justifier.  
Here are examples of cases of type (a), (b) and (c). This is a case in which one and the same 
mental state X of a subject S can directly contribute to the justification of a belief of S and indirectly 
contribute to the justification of another belief of S. Suppose Sally has the justified belief that (M) 
her ex-boyfriend will soon be moving out of London because, say, she was told by a common friend 
that he accepted a job in Moscow. Sally’s belief that M can directly contribute to the justification of 
her belief that (R) she will no longer see her ex-boyfriend around in London. For Sally can easily 
infer R from M, thereby acquiring doxastic justification for believing R on the basis of her belief 
that M. Sally’s very same justified belief that M can indirectly contribute to the justification of her 
different belief that (T) she still thinks of her ex-boyfriend. For Sally can easily form the justified 
introspective belief that she has the belief that M, and infer T from the proposition that she has the 
belief that M, thereby acquiring doxastic justification for believing T.  
Suppose a subject S is provided with ordinary background information. Then, typically, if a 
belief that E of S is able to contribute directly (indirectly) to the justification of another belief that P 
of S, the belief that E won’t also be able to contribute indirectly (directly) to the justification of S’s 
belief that P. This is so because, typically, when it is true that S’s belief that P is justified on the 
basis of S’s justified belief that E, it is not also true that S’s belief that P could be justified on the 
basis of S’s justified introspective belief that S has the belief that E, and vice versa. Sally’s case 
confirms what just said. Sally’s belief that R is justified on the basis of her belief that M, but Sally’s 
belief that R could not be justified––at least not on ordinary background information––if it were 
based on her justified introspective belief that she has the belief that M. So Sally’s belief that M 
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directly contributes to the justification of her belief that R, but it is unable to contribute indirectly 
to the justification of the same belief R.16 
Yet, as anticipated, it may also be the case that one and the same mental state X can 
contribute directly and indirectly to the justification of the same belief. This can happen, for 
instance, when X is a belief. As an example, consider again Sally’s case but suppose now that her 
background information departs from ordinary background information because it also includes the 
proposition that if someone has the belief that M, then R is true. Again, if Sally believes that M, she 
can easily form the justified introspective belief that she has the belief that M. Thus, if Sally infers R 
from the proposition that she has the belief that M, Sally acquires doxastic justification for believing 
R. In this case Sally’s belief that M––above and beyond being able to directly contributing to the 
justification of her belief that R––can also indirectly contribute to it.  
Suppose now that X is not a belief but a seeming. In normal circumstances a seeming that P 
can contribute to the justification of the same belief that P both directly and indirectly. Take for 
example S’s seeming that (Y) there is something yellow nearby. S’s seeming that Y can directly 
contribute to the justification of her belief that Y. For if S believes that Y on the basis of her seeming 
that Y, in absence of defeaters S’s belief will be justified to some extent. Consider furthermore that 
people’s ordinary background information includes the assumption that if it seems that Y, then it is 
normally the case that Y. Thus, if S has the seeming that Y, she can easily form the justified 
reflective belief that she has the seeming that Y. Hence, if S infers Y from the proposition that she 
has the seeming that Y, S acquires some doxastic justification for believing that Y. This means that 
ordinarily S’s seeming that Y can also indirectly contribute to the justification of her belief that Y. 
Clearly this is not always the case. If S’s background information did not contain the assumption 
that if it seems that Y, it is normally the case that Y, S’s seeming that Y couldn’t indirectly contribute 
                                                
16 There are exceptions. Take for instance the disjunctive proposition (D) that [P or S has the belief that P]. If based on 
S’s justified belief that P, S’s belief that D is justified. Thus S’s belief that P can directly contribute to the justification 
of S ’s belief that D. Yet S’s belief that D is obviously justified also if it is based on S’s justified introspective belief 
that S has the belief that P. Thus S’s belief that P can also indirectly contribute to the justification of S’s belief that D. 
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to the justification of S’s belief that Y. In this case, however, S’s seeming that Y could still 
contribute directly to the justification of S’s belief that Y. For S’s seeming that Y directly contributes 
to the justification of S’s belief that Y in virtue of its characteristic phenomenology, which wouldn’t 
be touched by this change in S’s background information. (More on this in what follows).       
The distinction between a mental state X’s contribution as a direct justifier and as an indirect 
justifier is crucial for our present purposes. For whether or not S ought to be strongly aware of X––
in Bergmann’s sense––in order to receive from X justification capable of preventing her belief that 
P from being accidentally true from her own perspective seems to depend on whether X’s 
contribution is direct or indirect.  
 
4.2 Indirect contribution requires strong awareness  
In this section we show that when S’s mental state X is an indirect contributor to the justification of 
S’s belief that P, S needs to be strongly aware of X if the truth of P is not to be accidental from her 
point of view. We start by highlighting an important feature of inferential acquisition of belief. 
Suppose that S is justified in believing that P, and that S infers Q from P, thereby forming the true 
belief that Q. Suppose, however, that S does not conceive (or, worse, S is unable to conceive) of the 
truth of P as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that Q. In this case––independently of 
whether the truth of P is relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that Q––it is strongly 
intuitive that the truth of S’s belief that Q is accidental from S’s perspective. Here is an example of 
an inference that, although it leads from a true premise to a true conclusion, is unable to prevent the 
subject’s belief in the conclusion from being accidentally true. Imagine that Sam acquires the 
justified belief that (K) Andrea’s mouth is replete with white spots on a reddened background––i.e. 
Koplik’s spots––and let H be the proposition that Andrea has contracted the measles. The truth of K 
is highly relevant to the justification or truth of H. However, Sam may still infer one proposition 
from the other and come to believe the truth of H accidentally, if Sam just ignores or has no 
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justification for supposing that K’s truth is relevant to the justification or truth of H. If Sam came 
to believe H on the basis of her justified belief that K, while ignoring or having no justification for 
supposing that the truth of K is relevant to the justification or truth of H, Sam would come believe 
the true, yet only accidentally. 
These considerations lead us to formulate the following principle of inferential belief 
acquisition: 
  
(INF) When S’s belief that P is based on S’s belief that E, the truth of S’s belief that P is 
non-accidental from S’s point of view if and only if S is justified in believing that E, 
and S justifiedly conceives of (or is at least able to justifiedly conceive of) the truth 
of E as relevant for the justification or truth of her belief that P.17   
 
(INF) casts light on why, when a mental state X contributes indirectly to the justification of S’s 
belief that P, S needs to be strongly aware of X in order for the truth of the belief that P not to be 
accidental from her own point of view.  
 Let X be a mental state of S, and suppose that X contributes indirectly to the justification of 
S’s belief that P. In accordance with (IJ), in this case S bases her belief that P on, not X, but her 
introspective belief that (E*) X occurs in S’s mind. On (INF), the truth of S’s belief that P is non-
accidental from S’s perspective only if S is justified in believing that E*, and S justifiedly conceives 
of (or is at least able to justifiedly conceive of) the truth of E* as relevant to the justification or truth 
of her belief that P. As––to repeat––E* is the proposition saying that X occurs in S’s mind, this can 
be the case only if, to begin with, S is justified in believing that X occurs in S’s mind––hence only if 
S is aware of X. Moreover, this can be the case only if S justifiedly conceives of (or is able to 
justifiedly conceive of) the truth of the proposition that X occurs in S’s mind as relevant to the 
                                                
17 (INF) bears an interesting similarity to Richard Fumerton’s Inferential Internalism (II), which is the principle saying 
that “in order to be justified in believing P on the basis of E, one must have justification for believing, not only E, but 
also the proposition that E makes P probable. (Fumerton 2006: 39). (INF) and (II), in particular, are arguably equivalent 
if we make the assumption that S’s belief is justified in the sense of (II) if and only if its truth is not accidental from S’s 
perspective. For a recent discussion of Fumerton’s principle (II), and of alternative principles of inferential justification, 
see Tucker (2012). Tucker contends that S’s higher-level awareness of the link between E and P needs to be neither 
justified nor doxastic in order for S to have inferential justification for believing P on the basis of S’s belief that E.  
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justification or truth of S’s belief that P. In conclusion, when X contributes indirectly to S’s 
justification for the belief that S, (INF) imposes that S be aware or at least potentially aware of X in 
such a way that S conceives of the truth of the proposition that X occurs in S’s mind as relevant to 
the justification or truth of her belief that P, if the truth of the latter belief is not to be accidental   
from S’s own perspective. Thus (INF) imposes that S––as claimed in general by Bergmann––be 
strongly aware of X.  
 
4.3 The requirement of strong awareness for direct contribution is unmotivated  
Let’s now turn to the case in which a mental state X of S is a direct contributor to the justification of 
S’s belief that P. Note, to begin with, that––along with (IJ)––if a mental state X* contributes 
indirectly to the justification of S’s belief that P, and O is the proposition describing the occurrence 
of X* in S’s mind, S’s belief that P is based on S’s introspective belief that O. Hence, when X* 
contributes indirectly to the justification of the belief that P, S’s mental state X coinciding with S’s 
belief that O––in accordance with (DJ)––contributes directly to it. When––or to the extent to 
which–– S’s belief that O contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P, S just bases 
her belief that P on her belief that O and not (also) on her belief that she has the belief that O.18 For 
this reason the application of (INF) offers no motivation for the requirement that S should be 
strongly aware of her belief that O in order to prevent S’s belief that P from being accidental from 
                                                
18 As we have seen, when X is one of S’s mental states, and X directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that 
P, X is normally unable, on S’s ordinary background information, to contribute also indirectly to the justification of the 
same belief that P. S’s background information may however depart from the ordinary one, and X can be at the same 
time a direct and an indirect contributor to the justification of S’s belief that P. When X directly and indirectly 
contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, it is false that S just bases her belief that P on her belief that O and 
not (also) on her belief that she has the belief that O. For since X contributes also indirectly to the justification of S’s 
belief that P, S also bases her belief that P on her belief that she has the belief that O. In order to keep either 
contribution of X to the justification of S’s belief that P distinct, in this case we say that to the extent to which X 
contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P, S just bases her belief that P on her belief that O and not 
(also) on her belief that she has the belief that O. 
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her point of view.19 When––or to the extent to which––S’s belief that O contributes directly to the 
justification of S’s belief that P, all that follows from (INF) is that S, in order for her belief that P 
not to be accidentally true from her own perspective, should simply have the justified belief that O 
and justifiedly conceive of (or at least be able to justifiedly conceive of) the truth of O as relevant to 
the justification or truth of her belief that P. In sum, when X* indirectly contributes to the 
justification of S’s belief that P, S’s mental state X coinciding with S’s belief that X* occurs in her 
mind directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P; and the sole condition that must be 
satisfied, if the truth of S’s belief that P is not to be accidental from her point of view, is that S 
should be strongly aware of X* (and not also of X.) 
A concrete example may help at this juncture. Imagine Sam wakes up in the morning and 
finds out that he is incapable of remembering where he had dinner last night: his latest memories 
before the supposed time of his dinner arrive at about 5pm, when he left his apartment looking for 
his car. There is then a memory gap of a few hours. Sam consults immediately his physician. The 
diagnosis is that he suffers from short-time amnesia caused by lack of testosterone. As a cure, Sam 
will assume testosterone tablets for a few days to restore the normal concentration of this hormone 
in his brain. At that point he will be able to remember where he dined last night. Sam starts taking 
the tablets. After a few days, the vivid memory of having had dinner at a Thai restaurant with a 
friend suddenly pops up in Sam’s mind. Call X* this mental state of Sam. As X* pops up, Sam 
forms the introspective belief that (O) he has X*, and bases on her belief that O the belief that (T) 
the concentration of testosterone in his brain is now normal. Intuitively, by so doing Sam comes 
justifiably to believe T. So, intuitively, X* indirectly contributes to the justification of Sam’s belief 
that T. Moreover, given the way in which S’s belief that T has been formed, it would not seem to be 
an accident, from Sam’s own perspective, if this belief were true. Unless Sam had acquired from the 
                                                
19 Suppose, instead, S’s based her belief that P on her belief that (E) she has the belief that O. In this case–along with 
the explanation given in the previous section––(INF) would impose that S should be strongly aware of her belief that O 
in order for S’s belief that P being non-accidental from S’s perspective. 
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diagnosis of his physician justification for believing that the truth of the proposition that O is 
relevant to the justification or truth of T, however, Sam’s belief that T would still have been open to 
the charge of being accidentally true from his point of view. To see this, imagine that Sam doesn’t 
see his physician initially and thus he has no clue about the link between his short-time amnesia and 
the lack of testosterone in his brain. If Sam formed anyway the belief T on the basis of his justified 
belief that O, in this case it would plainly be accidental that T is true from his perspective. In order 
for Sam’s belief that T not to be accidentally true, then, Sam must also have justification for 
conceiving of the truth of O as relevant to the justification or truth of his belief that T. In other 
words–since O is the proposition saying that Sam has X*––Sam must be strongly aware of X*. 
Consider now Sam’s introspective belief that the mental state X* occurs in his mind. 
Whereas Sam’s mental state X* contributes indirectly to the justification of his belief that T, Sam’s 
introspective belief that (O) he has the mental state X* does the same thing but directly. 
Importantly, the direct contribution of Sam’s belief that O to the justification of his belief that T 
seems able to prevent the accidental truth of the belief that T from Sam’s perspective independently 
of whether he is strongly aware of his belief that O. All that follows from (INF) is that Sam, in 
order for his belief that T not to be accidentally true form her own perspective, should simply have 
the justified belief that O and justifiedly conceive of (or at least be able to justifiedly conceive of) 
the truth of O as relevant to the justification or truth of his belief that T.  
We think that the conclusions reached in the above example can be generalized in two 
important ways. To begin with, it seems to us natural and intuitively plausible that they can be 
generalized to any case in which the direct justifier is a belief––i.e. to any case in which S’s justified 
belief that Q directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, whether or not Q describes 
the occurrence in S’s mind of some mental state indirectly contributing to the justification of S’s 
belief that P. When––and to the extent to which–– S’s justified belief that Q directly contributes to 
the justification of S’s belief that P, S bases her belief that P on her belief that Q. Along with (INF), 
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then, S can acquire a justification for believing P that pre-empts the accidental truth of her belief 
that P from her point of view if just S is justified in believing that Q, and S justifiedly conceives of 
(or is at least able to justifiedly conceive of) the truth of Q as relevant to the justification or truth of 
her belief that P. The satisfaction of these conditions requires of S, in particular, that she be aware 
of her belief that Q––call this belief X––in just the weak sense that S should have X. For if S didn’t 
have X, S could not be justified in believing that Q is true. Importantly, the satisfaction of the 
conditions above does not require of S that she also conceive of or only potentially conceive of (let 
alone with justification) X as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. Thus, quite 
generally when X is a belief and X is S’s basis for the belief that P, X’s direct contribution to the 
justification of the belief that P prevents this belief from being accidentally true from S’s 
perspective just on the condition that S be weakly aware of X.  
Let’s turn to the second generalization. It appears to us intuitively plausible that the 
conclusions reached in Sam’s example could also be extended to the case in which S’s mental state 
X directly contributing to the justification of S’s belief that P is not itself a belief––i.e. to the cases 
in which X is not a belief, and S is justified in believing P on the basis of X. For it seems to us 
plausible that the generalization considered before––i.e. that S need not be strongly aware of her 
belief X when X directly contributes to the justification of her belief that P, in order to prevent the 
truth of S’s belief that P from being accidental from her point of view––is just a special case of the 
more general claim, according to which, whether or not X is a belief, S need not be strongly aware 
of X, when X directly contributes to the justification of her belief that P, in order to prevent the truth 
of her belief that P from being accidental from her point of view. Our guiding intuition is the 
following: when––or to the extent to which––X directly contributes to justification of S’s belief that 
P, S does not base her belief that P on the introspective belief that X occurs. Consequently, it is 
difficult to see why S, if her belief that P is not to count as accidentally true from her perspective, 
should be required to be strongly aware of X––namely, in particular, why S should be required to 
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justifiedly believe (or at least to be able on reflection alone to justifiedly believe) that the truth of 
the proposition saying that X occurs in his mind is relevant to the justification or truth of her belief 
that P. For the sole circumstance in which this requirement is clearly motivated appears to be when 
S bases her belief that P, not on X itself, but on the introspective belief that X occurs in her mind.20 
Whenever X contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P, and X does prevent 
S’s belief that P from being accidentally true from the point of view of S, we should then expect to 
find some factor explaining why this happens that is operative at the sole condition that S merely 
have X. Let us begin by inspecting the case in which the direct contributor X is a belief––say, S’s 
belief that E. In this case, in order for the truth of the belief that P to be non-accidental from S’s 
perspective, (INF) requires (1) that S be justified in believing that E, and that (2) S justifiedly 
conceive of (or be able to justifiedly conceive of) the truth of E as relevant to the justification or 
truth of her belief that P. When the latter two-fold condition is met, we can say that X prevents S’s 
                                                
20 Philosophers sympathetic to Bergmann’s views may grant this but still insist that when X is a mental state of S, and X 
directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P, S must be strongly aware of X if her belief that P is not to be 
accidentally true from her own perspective. The apparently most straightforward line of argument for these 
philosophers is to appeal to a principle like the following: 
 
(BAS)  When S’s belief that P is based on S’s mental state X, the truth of S’s belief that P is non-accidental 
from S’s point of view only if S justifiedly conceives of (or is at least able to justifiedly conceive of) X 
as relevant by itself to the justification or truth of her belief that P. 
 
Suppose in fact X contributes directly to the justification of S’s belief that P. In this case (INF) cannot motivate the 
requirement that S should be strongly aware of X in the specific sense that entails that S conceives of the truth of the 
proposition describing the occurrence of X as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. Yet, in this very 
case, (BAS) seems to motivate the requirement that S should be strongly aware of X in the different sense entailing that 
S conceives of X itself as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P.  
We don’t think this strategy will succeed. For it seems to us that the claim that S’s mental state X is relevant by 
itself to the justification or the truth of S’s belief that P––as contrasted with the claim that the truth of the proposition 
describing the occurrence of X is relevant to the justification or the truth of S’s belief that P––cannot be interpreted in 
such a way that (BAS) turns out true. Suppose S directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P. In this case, 
there is a clear sense in which X can be described as being relevant to the justification or truth of S’s belief that P, for X 
is the mental state upon which S bases her justified belief that P. However, if to conceive of X as relevant to the 
justification or truth of S’s belief that P means to conceive of X as the basis of S’s justified belief that P, (BAS) is 
unmotivated. For it is far from clear why S should––in addition to just having X, and basing upon X her belief that P––
also conceive of X as the basis of her justified belief that P in order to prevent this belief from being accidental from he 
point of view. There might be alternative interpretations of the claim that X is relevant to the justification or truth of S’s 
belief that P capable of producing a more plausible reading of (BAS). Until further notice, however, we feel entitled to 
dismiss the strategy at issue as unsuccessful. 
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belief that P from being accidentally true from S’s perspective by displaying a recognizable 
symptom of the truth of P to S.  
Displaying a recognizable symptom of the truth of P to S is not the sole way in which a 
mental state X of S, to the extent to which X contributes as a direct justifier of S’s belief that P, can 
prevent that belief from being accidentally true from S’s perspective. Another way in which X can 
do so is when X displays, not a recognizable symptom of the truth of P, but the truth of P itself to S. 
A key example of this is when X is S’s seeming that P.  
As we have seen, the assumption that if it seems to one that P, then P is probably true is 
normally part of a subject S’s background information. It is thus generally true that S’s seeming that 
P can indirectly contribute to the justification of S’s belief that P as long as S comes to entertain the 
introspective belief that she has the seeming that P. To the extent to which its indirect contribution 
is concerned, S’s seeming that P can pre-empt the accidental truth of S’s belief that P from S’s 
perspective only if S is strongly aware of that seeming. Namely, only if S has the justified 
introspective belief that (E) she has the seeming that P, and S justifiedly conceives of (or is able to 
justifiedly conceive of) the truth of E as relevant to the justification or truth of her belief that P. 
However, consider that S’s seeming that P can also–and more centrally does–contribute directly to 
the justification of the belief that P. As far as its direct contribution to the justification of S’s belief 
that P is concerned, S’s seeming that P can pre-empt the accidental truth of S’s belief that P from 
S’s perspective even if S is not strongly aware of the seeming. For upon just having her seeming 
that P––i.e. upon simply being weakly aware of her seeming that P––S will experience the 
distinctive phenomenology of a display of the truth of P. And it is strongly intuitive that S’s 
experiencing this phenomenology (which is the phenomenology of a disclosure of the fact that P) is 
a way to make the truth of S’s belief that P non-accidental from her point of view, provided that S 
bases her belief that P on that experience. Hence, S’s simply having a seeming that P and basing 
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her belief that P on it appears sufficient to pre-empt the accidental truth of the belief that P from 
S’s perspective.  
 
4.4 Phenomenal conservatism escapes Bergmann’s dilemma 
Phenomenal conservatism entails that, in absence of defeaters, S’s belief that P is non-inferentially 
justified to some degree if it is based on its seeming to S that P. Remember that saying that the 
justification bestowed by S’s seeming that P on S’s belief that P is non-inferential is saying that this 
justification is not based (not even in part) on justification for other beliefs. Consider now that 
when––and to the extent to which––S’s seeming that P contributes indirectly to the justification of 
the belief that P, S’s seeming that P provides S with inferential justification for her belief that P. 
(This is so because in order for S’s seeming that P to contribute indirectly to the justification of S’s 
belief that P, S must base this belief on her justified introspective belief that she has the seeming 
that P). Hence the view entailed by phenomenal conservatism is that, in absence of defeaters, S’s 
seeming that P directly contributes to the justification of S’s belief that P. This implies––in light of 
the findings of the above section––that the phenomenal conservative can legitimately take S’s mere 
weak awareness of a seeming that P to pre-empt the accidental truth of S’s seeming based belief 
that P from S’s perspective. This is why phenomenal conservatism escapes Bergmann’s dilemma.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
As we have indicated in the introduction, a reason why phenomenal conservatism is philosophically 
attractive is that it affords the means to respond to celebrated sceptical challenges targeting any 
view of epistemic justification that assumes that the justification for any belief is always based on 
some other belief. Views of this sort have traditionally been charged with leading to scepticism. 
Suppose S entertains the justified belief that P. If S’s beliefs can be justified only by other beliefs of 
her, S will have a chain of beliefs, culminating at one end with the belief that P, with one or more 
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branches. As indicated in the introduction, the sceptic contends that there are only three ways in 
which any branch can be organized, each of which is unable to ensure justification for S’s initial 
belief that P: S has no justification for the last belief in the branch; S is deemed to have justification 
for each belief in the branch but the branch is circular; S is deemed to have justification for each 
belief in the branch but the branch never ends. (PCD) offers a fourth option: the branch ends with a 
belief of S that is justified by the way things seem to S.  
Our conclusion that phenomenal conservatism escapes Bergmann’s dilemma, above and 
beyond being interesting in itself, has thus the greater epistemological significance of lending 
support to a promising form of internalist foundationalism that combines (PCD) with a principle of 
inferential justification of this type: 
 
(BEL) A subject S’s belief that P is prima facie justified (to some degree) if it is based on 
S’s justified belief that E, and S justifiedly conceives of (or is at least able to 
justifiedly conceive of) the truth of E as relevant to the justification or truth of her 
belief that P. 
 
According to this combined view, our basic beliefs are prima facie justified by the ways things 
seem to be to us in the way described by (PCD), and this justification is then inferentially 
transmitted to the rest of ours beliefs in the way described by (BEL).  
Of course, the conclusion that (PCD) escapes Bergmann’s dilemma would not have this 
greater significance if (BEL) itself fell prey to the same dilemma. In that case the internalist 
foundationalist would face the hard choice between claiming that none of S’s non-basic beliefs is 
(inferentially) justified for S because of the vicious infinite regress described by Bergmann, and 
claiming that S’s (inferential) justification of S’s non-basic beliefs cannot prevent these beliefs from 
being accidentally true from S’s perspective, and thus actually unjustified for S. A result already 
established in §4.3 is, however, that (BEL) doesn’t fall afoul of Bergmann’s dilemma. It would do 
so if S, in (BEL), were required to be strongly aware of her belief that E in order to receive from 
this mental state justification that averts the accidental truth of the belief that P. Yet we have seen 
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that S is not subject to this requirement when her belief that E belief directly contributes to the 
justification of the belief that P in the way described by (BEL). 
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